open: no social decision is immediately required. But for those matters that cannot be left open, we propose that some supplementary mechanism can be used for settling things that Symmetrical Special-Majority voting cannot. We discuss the problem of breaking ties in Section IV and sketch some proposals in Section V.
We precede those practical considerations with some formal ones on those two alternative forms of special-majority voting. Democratic decision procedures can, broadly, be defended either on grounds of their procedural (fairness) merits or on grounds of their epistemic truth-tracking capacities or both. 15 We analyze the formal characteristics of the two forms of special-majority voting, first from a procedural perspective (Section I) and then from an epistemic one (Section II), comparing both forms of special-majority rule with simple majority rule. The procedural standards are variations on those that Kenneth May famously showed to characterize Simple Majority Voting itself. 16 The epistemic standards are of a Bayesian sort, growing out of related work on the Condorcet Jury Theorem. 17 We identify a 'trilemma', in both the procedural and epistemic realms. In each, there are three properties we might like a voting rule to display, but any given rule can display at most two of them at once. 18 Our choice among voting rules -Simple Majority rule, Asymmetrical Special-Majority rule or Symmetrical Special-Majority rule -depends on which of the three desiderata we are prepared to sacrifice. What is at stake in this choice is summarized in Section III.
Each of the formal discussions in this article is preceded by an informal statement of the issues involved. Furthermore, the formal discussions themselves are of a relatively accessible sort. Proofs appear in the appendices.
I. PROCEDURAL PROPERTIES OF SIMPLE AND SPECIAL-MAJORITY RULES
Procedurally, the great attraction of democratic decision rules is that they embody a regime of 'fair equality' among participants in making collective decisions. 19 No individual is privileged over any other. Moreover, under simple majority voting -the paradigmatic democratic decision rule -no option is privileged over any other. An option is socially chosen, or not, just depending on how many votes it gets, not on what option it is and not on who voted for it.
These criteria of 'fair equality' have been formalized in the social choice literature.
There, May's Theorem 'is deservedly considered a minor classic'. 20 In a literature replete with negative (impossibility) results, May's Theorem tells us what positively can be said in favour of Simple Majority rule. It shows that Simple Majority rule -and it alone among all decision procedures -simultaneously satisfies four conditions, each of which seems independently desirable on democratic grounds.
Here we assess both forms of special-majority rule against analogous conditions. To foreshadow our conclusions: Both forms of special-majority rule require a relaxation of one of those conditions, but different ones. Symmetrical Special-Majority rules relax the responsiveness condition (permitting more ties), Asymmetrical ones the symmetry condition.
Which, if either, form of special-majority rule is attractive in a given context depends on whether we have grounds in that context for relaxing the relevant condition.
I.1. An Informal Statement
The conditions which May shows to be uniquely satisfied by Simple Majority rule are stated formally in Section I.2. We here describe them informally and suggest why they are democratically appealing. We consider a social decision problem with two options (e.g. two candidates, or the acceptance or rejection of some proposition).
The first condition, 'universal domain', stipulates that the voting rule renders a decision (where a tie is a decision, too) for every logically possible combination -or 'profile' -of votes. 21 This requirement is democratically compelling. A voting rule should be open to all possible combinations of votes that might be entered into it. If certain combinations of votes were rejected as inadmissible, they would be effectively disenfranchised. For technical simplicity, we assume that no voter is indifferent between the two options, but this assumption can in principle be relaxed.
The second condition, 'anonymity', stipulates that it does not matter who votes for what; 22 all that matters is how many votes are cast for each option. The democratic appeal of this condition is obvious.
Just as 'anonymity' requires that all voters be treated equally, so the third condition, 'symmetry', requires that all options be treated equally. 23 Again, it seems a democratically appealing requirement that a given combination of votes for one option should yield the same decision on that option that it would yield on another option if it were for that other option.
'Anonymity' and 'symmetry', 'taken together... embody an interpretation of the basic idea of popular will theories of political fairness -any fair method for aggregating individual preferences should treat each person' s preference equally'. 24 They embody the principle that each citizen's 'opinion is at least as good as any other's'. 25 May's fourth condition, 'positive responsiveness', can be split into two conditions, 'monotonicity' and 'one-vote-responsiveness'. 'Monotonicity' states that, if some votes change in a certain direction (e.g. from 'against' to 'for' a proposition) while all other votes remain fixed, then the social decision should not change in the opposite direction. 'One-voteresponsiveness' states that, starting from a situation in which the decision is one of social indifference, the change of one vote in a certain direction should be enough to break the social indifference in the direction of the change (e.g. if one person who initially opposes a proposition changes to vote in favour of it, then the social decision should also change to favour the proposition).
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'Monotonicity' and 'one-vote-responsiveness' capture some important democratic desiderata associated with Simple Majority rule. 'Monotonicity' requires social decisions to be a positive (precisely: non-negative) function of how people vote, which is the essence of democracy. 'One-vote-responsiveness' captures the idea that every single vote counts, by ensuring that in the case of a tie the change of a single vote determines the outcome.
May's theorem states that Simple Majority rule is the unique voting rule that satisfies all of May's conditions simultaneously. All other voting rules violate at least one condition.
All voting rules of a 'majoritarian type' considered here -simple and special ones alike -satisfy 'universal domain', 'anomyity' and 'monotonicity' (see Appendix I).
Asymmetrical Special-Majority rules violate May's 'symmetry' condition, while Symmetrical Special-Majority rules satisfy that condition. To justify an Asymmetrical Special-Majority rule, therefore, we need some justification for the asymmetry (for the 'bias' in favour of the default option) -and also for the 'size' of that asymmetry (as reflected in the size of the special majority required for the other option to prevail).
By contrast, Symmetrical Special-Majority rules violate 'one-vote-responsiveness'
(they are responsive only to a change of enough votes to constitute a 'special majority'),
while Asymmetrical Special-Majority rules satisfy that condition. Of course, whatever reasons we have for requiring a 'special majority' to make a decision, those might also constitute reasons for modifying the responsiveness requirement accordingly. Below we generalize the condition of 'one-vote-responsiveness' to that of 'k-votes-responsiveness', where k is the number of votes sufficient to break a tie. Where no option receives the requisite 'special majority', a Symmetrical Special-Majority rule deems the decision to be a 'tie'; and such ties may occur even if one option receives more votes than the other (just insufficiently many more).
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In Section I.2, we identify a 'trilemma'. If we want to give all minorities above a certain size a 'veto power' (which is what special-majority rules do), then we must sacrifice either the condition of 'symmetry' or that of 'no non-trivial ties'. 28 We prove that a voting rule can satisfy any two of those conditions -veto powers; symmetry; no non-trivial tiesbut no voting rule can satisfy all three. Simple Majority rule satisfies the last two but forsakes the first (it allows no vetoes). Asymmetrical Special-Majority rules satisfy the first and last but forsake the middle (they lack symmetry). Symmetrical Special-Majority rules satisfy the first and second but forsake the last (they allow non-trivial ties).
I.2. A formal statement 29
The Framework
We suppose that n individuals have to make a collective decision over two options, e.g. the acceptance or rejection of some proposition, or two alternatives or candidates in an election.
The individuals are labeled 1, 2, …, n, the options are labelled 1 and -1. 
Examples of less attractive voting rules are the following: A procedural argument for a particular voting rule is an argument that this rule has certain desirable procedural properties.
The Properties of Simple Majority Rule
May's theorem states that Simple Majority rule is the unique voting rule that satisfies the following conditions.
Universal domain (U).
The domain of f is the set of all logically possible profiles. Simple Majority rule satisfies both (PV k ) and (NV k ) with k = n/2. But it does not satisfy either condition for any integer k < n/2. So no minorities -groups of size less than n/2 -have any veto powers under Simple Majority Voting.
Anonymity (A)
.
The Trilemma between Symmetry, No Non-trivial Ties and Minority Veto Powers
We have seen that Simple Majority rule satisfies symmetry and no non-trivial ties, but it does not give any veto powers to minorities. Are there any other voting rules satisfying all of We are faced with a trilemma. No voting rule can satisfy all three of (1), (2) and (3), but any two of (1), (2) and (3) If we want to ensure certain minority veto powers, we need to relax either (1) or (2).
Asymmetrical Special-Majority rules satisfy (2) and (3) while violating (1). Symmetrical
Special-Majority rules satisfy (1) and (3) while violating (2).
Asymmetrical Special-Majority Rules
If we relax symmetry but do not permit non-trivial ties, not only is one alternative always privileged over the other; the minority veto powers the special-majority rule grants are then themselves also asymmetrical. There is always, in that case, a trade-off between minority veto powers over negative decisions and minority veto powers over positive decisions. If we give a minority of size k 1 < n/2 veto power over positive decisions, then at most a supermajority of size greater than n-k 1 > n/2 has veto power over negative decisions, and vice-versa. An Asymmetrical Special-Majority rule can be defined as follows:
Asymmetrical Special-Majority Rule with parameter m. For any v,
If m > 0 (if n is even) or m > 1 (if n is odd), the Asymmetrical Special-Majority rule is biased in favour of -1. In that case, a minority of size greater than (n-m)/2 can veto a positive decision; but only a supermajority of size at least (n+m)/2 can veto a negative decision. If m ≤ 0 (if n is even) or m ≤ -1 (if n is odd), the rule is biased in favour of 1. In that case, any minority of size greater than (n+m-1)/2 can veto a negative decision; but only a supermajority of size at least (n-m+1)/2 can veto a positive decision. 
Symmetrical Special-Majority Rules
If we keep symmetry, but permit non-trivial ties, then it is the case not only that no alternative is privileged over the other, but also that the minority veto powers that the special majority rule grants are always symmetrical.
Proposition 4. Suppose a voting rule satisfies (U) and (S). Then, for any k, it satisfies (PV k ) if and only if it satisfies (NV k ).
A Symmetrical Special-Majority rule can be defined as follows: 
The more responsive the voting rule (i.e. the smaller the value of k 2 in 'k 2 -votes responsiveness'), the larger the group size k 1 that is required for vetoing a (positive or negative) decision. Condition (VR 1 ) (where k 2 = 1), as satisfied by Simple Majority rule,
, and thus rules out minority veto powers.
II. EPISTEMIC PROPERTIES OF SIMPLE AND SPECIAL-MAJORITY RULES
Democratic procedures commend themselves not only on the grounds of procedural fairness, such as those formalized in May' s Theorem. They also commend themselves on epistemic grounds, in terms of their truth-tracking power.
Aristotle's loose talk of the 'wisdom of the multitude' was formalized in the Condorcet Jury Theorem in the eighteenth century and has been intensively explored in recent years. 31 The theorem shows that, if individuals cast their votes independently of one another and each voter is more than 0.5 likely to be correct in a two-option choice, the probability that the majority vote is correct is an increasing function of the size of the electorate, approaching certainty as the number of individuals tends to infinity. Majority voting is, in that sense, a good truth-tracker.
II.1. An Informal Statement
Here we explore a Bayesian version of the familiar Condorcet Jury model, to reveal an epistemic trilemma analogous to the procedural one above. 32 The role of a 'minority veto' condition in the procedural case is taken by a 'no reasonable doubt' condition in the epistemic one. The issues discussed here arise in various circumstances, legal, medical and administrative. 33 Sometimes we want to make very certain we are right before acting. Members of a criminal jury are asked to convict only if they are convinced 'beyond a reasonable doubt' of the defendant's guilt: something like a 95 percent probability that the defendant is guilty. In civil trials, in contrast, the standard of proof is merely 'more likely than not': a probability just over 50 percent, either way, is sufficient for a decision.
Sometimes we think that the evidentiary burden ought to weigh disproportionately in one direction. In the criminal jury case, while the prosecution has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense does not. Other times, we think that the evidentiary burden ought to be symmetrical, as in civil cases.
Sometimes, yet again, we think that the standard of proof should be 'no reasonable doubt', but that that standard should apply symmetrically to both sides of the proposition.
Suppose, for example, we are dealing with a drug that would, at worst, have only mildly unpleasant side-effects; and that, at best, would alleviate a condition which is only mildly unpleasant. There we might suppose: (1) the state should allow the sale of the drug under the imprimatur of a 'licensed and approved therapeutic agent' only upon production of evidence that it is 90 percent certain that the drug is safe and effective in alleviating the condition; (2) the state should prohibit the sale of the drug only if it is 90 percent certain that it does more harm than good; and (3) the state should allow the drug to be sold over the counter as a 'folk remedy', but without any official imprimatur, if neither of those conditions is met.
The form that the trilemma takes in the epistemic case is this. There are three properties we might like to see in our epistemic decision procedure. One is 'symmetry' in the epistemic sense: positive decisions are held to the same standard of proof as negative ones. A second is an epistemic equivalent of 'no non-trivial ties' (ties occur only where the probability of the truth of a proposition equals that of its negation). The third is a 'no reasonable doubt' standard, requiring more than a 'more-likely-than-not' threshold to be crossed before we decide for or against some proposition.
The trilemma, epistemically, is that any two of those conditions can be met -but not all three at once. Assuming independent voters each of whom is more likely to be right than wrong, Simple Majority rule meets the first and second conditions but not the third. Suitable
Asymmetrical Special-Majority rules meet the second and third but not the first. Suitable
Symmetrical Special-Majority rules meet the first and third but not the second.
Here again, we sometimes have grounds for sacrificing one of those conditions.
Which voting rule we want to adopt, on epistemic grounds, follows from those reasons we have for considering one or another condition more important, in any given situation. 34 
II.2. A Formal Statement 35 The Framework
We begin by stating Condorcet's classical model of jury decisions. We assume that there are two possible states of the world, represented by the variable X, which takes the value 1 or -1.
The two possible states of the world might be, respectively, the guilt or innocence of a defendant, or the truth or falsity of some factual proposition. Again, we assume that there are votes. Condorcet's model makes two assumptions, which we will tentatively retain throughout the following discussion and results. 36 First, if the state of the world is 1, the individuals each have a greater than 1/2 chance of voting for 1; and if it is -1, they each have a greater than 1/2 chance of voting for -1.
Competence. For each individual i, Pr(
where p (the individual competence level) is the same for all individuals.
The probability Pr(V i = 1 | X = 1) (respectively Pr(V i = -1 | X = -1)) is the conditional probability that individual i votes for 1 (respectively -1), given that the state of the world is 1 (respectively -1).
Secondly, once the state of the world is given, the votes of different individuals are independent from each other.
Independence. The votes of different individuals V 1 , V 2 , …, V n are independent, given the state of the world X.
In short, the votes of different individuals are independent identically distributed signals about the state of the world, where each signal is noisy but biased towards the truth.
The key idea of an epistemic account of voting is that a particular voting pattern provides evidence about the state of the world, and that a good evaluation of that evidence -using a suitable voting rule -allows a group to make decisions that track the state of the world reliably. An epistemic argument for a particular voting rule is an argument that a group using this voting rule will be good at making decisions that track the state of the world reliably.
The Properties of Simple Majority Rule
Let us first address the properties of Simple Majority rule from an epistemic perspective.
(1) The standard of proof Suppose we assign an equal prior probability of 1/2 to each of the two states of the world, 1
and -1. This need not be an objective probability; in the absence of more precise information, we might justify this equiprobability assumption by some normative principle ('no bias') or some methodological principle (Laplace's 'principle of insufficient reason'). Condorcet's own presentation implicitly relied on this assumption. 37 While the present exposition uses Bayesian notions and therefore requires a prior probability assignment over the different states of the world, we present a classical (non-Bayesian) statistical variant of the present results in Appendix IV, which requires no assumption about prior probabilities at all.
The first thing to note is that, other things being equal, observing an individual vote for 1 (respectively -1) should increase our degree of belief in the hypothesis that the state of the world is 1 (respectively -1). Observing more such votes should increase our degree of belief in that hypothesis further. Whenever we observe a majority of votes for 1, this should lead us to believe that X = 1 is more likely to be true than X = -1. Likewise, whenever we observe a majority for -1, this should lead us to believe that X = -1 is more likely to be true than X = 1. In short, under Simple Majority Voting, a positive decision is made if and only if X = 1 is more likely to be true than X = -1; a negative decision is made if and only if X = -1 is more likely to be true than X = 1.
However, in many situations, we require that a positive decision be made, not as soon as X = 1 is more likely to be true than X = -1, but only if we believe, beyond any reasonable doubt, that X = 1 is true. Consider the following two conditions: 
The Trilemma between Symmetry, No Non-trivial Ties and No Reasonable Doubt
We have seen that Simple Majority Voting satisfies both symmetry and no non-trivial ties in the epistemic sense, but it cannot implement a threshold of 'no reasonable doubt' significantly greater than 1/2 for either positive or negative decisions. In analogy with the procedural case, we may ask whether there are any other voting rules satisfying all of (1) symmetry in the epistemic sense, (2) no non-trivial ties in the epistemic sense, (3) no reasonable doubt.
The following result gives a negative answer to this question. Again, we are faced with a trilemma. No voting rule can satisfy all three of (1), (2) and (3), but any two of (1), (2) and (3) are satisfiable. Simple Majority Voting satisfies (1) and (2) 
Asymmetrical Special-Majority Rules
If we relax symmetry but do not permit non-trivial ties, we are faced with a trade-off between standards of proof for positive and negative decisions. If we demand a standard of proof for positive decisions that is significantly greater than 1/2, then we cannot also demand a standard of proof for negative decisions that is greater than or equal to 1/2. Likewise, if we demand a standard of proof for negative decisions that is significantly greater than 1/2, then we cannot also demand a standard of proof for negative decisions that is greater than or equal to 1/2.
In jury decisions this seems acceptable, as the standard of proof for conviction should be higher than that for acquittal. But in other decision problems, where there is no antecedently privileged alternative, we may require a symmetrical standard of proof. And if we require not only a standard of proof that is symmetrical, but also one that is significantly greater than 1/2, then we are led to a Symmetrical Special-Majority rule. 40 
Symmetrical Special-Majority Rules
We can now provide a characterization result on Symmetrical Special-Majority rules. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The trilemmas in Figure 1 help us see what is at stake in the choice among alternative voting rules. The decision tree in Figure 2 summarizes that choice.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Procedurally, the great disadvantage of Simple Majority rule is the risk of majority tyranny.
Under Simple Majority rule, the majority might ride roughshod over the interests of 'discrete and insular' minorities that have distinctive interests but only a minority of the votes. We may wish to protect such minorities by requiring that decisions affecting them be taken by 'special majorities' sufficiently large to, in effect, give such minorities veto power.
Often, of course, there is no such problem. There may be no real risk of any group being so discrete and insular as to be in danger of being tyrannized by a majority. Then
Simple Majority rule is satisfactory. Indeed, in the limiting case where there are absolutely no factions (every pair of voters is as likely to vote with one another as against one another), Simple Majority rule is the voting rule that uniquely maximizes each voter's probability of being on the winning side of an election. 41 Thus, Simple Majority rule works fine where there are no factions or any other reasons to grant submajorities veto power over the social outcome. But where there is a genuine risk of sufficiently cohesive submajorities with sufficiently strong and distinctive interests, we may want to give them extra power over the outcome. Under certain special conditions, Simple Majority rule might itself provide them with that (if, for example, the groups in question are pivotal in coalition or majority-cycling situations). 42 But giving submajorities anything like a strong veto power requires us to abandon Simple Majority rule in favour of some form of special-majority voting.
Epistemically, likewise, Simple Majority rule is ideal so long as we merely want to identify propositions that are 'more likely than not' to be true. But if we require greater confidence, we need some form of special-majority voting. 43 The great disadvantage of ordinary Asymmetrical Special-Majority rules is precisely their asymmetry. They privilege one option as the 'default' one that prevails if the other option does not receive the requisite 'special majority'.
Again, sometimes that is not a problem. There may be good grounds for privileging one option in that way. There are good grounds for a presumption of innocence in criminal trials, and for making it harder to convict than to acquit. There are good grounds for requiring a larger legislative majority to overturn a president's veto than was required to pass the bill in the first place, in order for a mixed constitution to provide genuine checks and balances.
Thus, there exist cases in which the asymmetries built into Asymmetrical SpecialMajority rules are not arbitrary. But the burden must be on advocates of the differential treatment of the various options to provide a justification for the asymmetry.
Symmetrical Special-Majority rules solve that problem by treating all options symmetrically. They require the same 'special majority' for either option in order for it to be chosen. The great disadvantage of a Symmetrical Special-Majority rule is that it may generate many 'non-trivial ties'. It chooses neither option as the social decision if neither achieves the requisite majority -even if one option got more votes than the other.
Sometimes this might not be a problem. Sometimes it does no harm to leave the matter unsettled. But in general, we put something to a vote only when we genuinely need to have the issue resolved; and hence a voting rule that leaves too many things unsettled seems problematic. It is to that problem that we now turn.
IV. BREAKING TIES
The problem with leaving things formally unsettled is that, as we have long been aware, 'nondecisions' are decisions too. 44 Something will happen, or not happen, in consequence of things being left undecided; some interests will be well-served, and others ill-served. 45 Leaving things undecided is not without consequences. 46 So it is genuinely a problem that Symmetrical Special-Majority rules may leave things undecided. Notice, however, that most decision rules -including Simple Majority rule with an even number of voters -have to face the problem of what to do in the case of tied votes. 47 Ties may occur more frequently under Symmetrical Special-Majority rules, but the problem is nowise unique to them. Examining how that problem is handled in connection with other voting rules gives us some hints as to how we might solve that problem with respect to Symmetrical Special-Majority rules.
Generically, there are three ways of resolving ties. Either: (1) we can privilege one of the options; or (2) we can privilege one of the voters; or (3) we can settle issues on which there are ties by some wholly separate procedure.
Cursory inspection of actual decision procedures reveals many examples of (1). The most familiar is the rule that 'the status quo remains in force unless some alternative to it is enacted'.
There are not many cases of (2) . One example rather like that might be the practice of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives casting the deciding vote in cases of a tie.
But even that is not a completely clean case of (2). It is not as if the Speaker has a 'golden vote'. Rather (by convention) the Speaker only votes when his vote is 'golden', i.e., in cases of a tie when his vote will indeed decide the matter. The details of those arcane arrangements matter less than their structure, for present purposes.
The structure of the decision rule is this: in case of a tie, decide the issue through some other procedure altogether.
V. TIE-BREAKERS UNDER SYMMETRICAL SPECIAL-MAJORITY RULES
Here we explore two possible variations on that 'other procedure' strategy for breaking the ties generated by Symmetrical Special-Majority rules. The first, which can be used only in very special circumstances, would be for authorities (perhaps most naturally 'judicial authorities') to decide matters that voting has left formally undecided, by extrapolating further decisions from ones that have already been made under a suitable Symmetrical Special-Majority rule. The second mechanism, which can be used in any federal system, is to let lower levels of government settle issues that are left open by Symmetrical SpecialMajority voting at the higher level.
V.1. Judicial Extrapolation
Suppose the legislature has ruled authoritatively on certain propositions, and indeed done so by some very large majority. Suppose, however, it has left certain other matters undecided, and we require some resolution of those issues. Under certain special circumstances, it might be permissible for some authoritative agent (perhaps most naturally judicial authorities) to extrapolate from what has been agreed to by those legislative 'special majorities' to other propositions that are implied by what has been agreed, treating those 'implied' propositions as having the same status as those that had actually been agreed to.
One common principle of extrapolation along these lines, for example, is that 'those who intend an end intend the means strictly necessary to attain that end'. So a legislature that has enacted a statute that assigns powers and responsibilities to the 'Bureau of the Census'
will be construed as having endorsed the existence of such a Bureau, even if the legislature neglected to stipulate that in the statute itself.
One of the worries surrounding such 'judicial legislation' in general is that the judges might well make laws that are contrary to ones the legislature itself would have enacted. In ordinary circumstances, that is a genuine worry. It is particularly worrisome wherever decisions involving multiple connected propositions are made by Simple Majority rule. 51 To illustrate, imagine three decision-makers who each have a certain set of views over three propositions: P; 'P implies Q'; and Q. The first believes that P is true, that P implies Q, and therefore that Q is also true. The second believes that P is true, but does not believe that P implies Q, so is consistent in also believing that Q is false. The third accepts that P implies Q but believes that P and Q are both false. Suppose these individuals vote on each of these propositions. A majority (two out of three) hold that P is true; a majority (two out of three) hold that P implies Q; and yet a majority (two out of three) hold that Q is false.
Were the judiciary to extrapolate from the majority acceptance of P and 'P implies Q' that Q should also be law, this would be opposite to what a majority vote on Q would have yielded.
Symmetrical Special-Majority voting can assuage those worries. For that to be the case, the 'special majority' supporting each of the component propositions needs to be high:
it must be more than (s-1)/s of the individuals, where s is the number of distinct propositions on which decisions are to be made (including basic propositions like P and Q and propositions connecting them like 'P implies Q'). It can be proven that, if propositions (basic and connecting ones) are accepted only if they command a special majority of that size, then there will not be a similarly large special majority against any inferences drawn from the combination of accepted propositions. 52 Thus, judges can draw, and impose as law, the logical implications of the laws that the legislature has passed by 'special majorities' of the requisite size. (Note well, those implications must be derived by rules of inference that the legislators themselves do -or presumably would -agree to, by a similar-sized 'special majority'.) Judges can do that, confident that their verdicts will not be contrary to the will of any similarly large special majority among the legislature. Still, there are such cases. Consider the principle, mentioned above, that 'endorsing the ends implies endorsing the necessary means'. In terms of our three-proposition example above: P is the end; 'P implies Q' is the proposition that 'if P is the end then Q is a necessary means to that end'; and so Q is the means in question. Since we have three propositions, any special majority requirement of more than 2/3 of the individuals would be sufficient.
V.2. Federal Subsidiarity
A second mechanism for resolving ties generated by Symmetrical Special-Majority voting can be found in the division of decisional responsibilities within a federal system.
To help motivate our proposal here, consider a familiar aspect of appellate court practice. In courts of appeal, it is standard for the judgment of the lower court to be allowed to stand, if the higher court splits evenly on the appeal.
Barry and Hardin discuss that practice and describe it as a violation of May's 'neutrality' condition. 54 Certainly that rule privileges one outcome over the other: whichever outcome was the one chosen by the lower court. But the 'whichever' in that last sentence is crucial. It is not any particular outcome that is privileged by this rule, as the 'default option' is in the Asymmetrical Special-Majority rule. Instead, what is privileged is a particular decision-maker -the lower court. Furthermore, the decision-maker thus privileged is not one of the participants in the appeals court (not the senior judge of the panel, for example), which would violate the 'anonymity' condition. What is actually privileged by this rule is a wholly separate decision process, to be used for making the decision when this process yields no determinate choice: when the higher court is tied, the decision of the lower court stands.
Of course, that particular rule actually operates only for the very special case of a literally 'tied' verdict in an appeals court that operates according to Simple Majority rule. But we propose that model, suitably generalized, as a good strategy for solving the much more frequent 'ties' that can be expected under Symmetrical Special-Majority voting.
The generalized version of this rule, as applied to a federal system (like the European Union, for example), might be this. The higher-level authority can be empowered to act only on the basis of a 'special majority' of the requisite size. There is no 'default' option that wins if no other option commands that number of votes; if no option commands the requisite 'special majority', the higher-level authority has simply not decided in favour of any option. The point remains, however, that the decision is at least a decision, rather than just the automatic consequence of some arbitrary 'default'. There are reasons for the decision, which people can discuss and debate in those other fora. An Asymmetrical Special-Majority rule, in contrast, would simply impose some outcome merely by default.
In the course of breaking the 'ties' left by the Symmetrical Special-Majority rule at the higher level, lower-level jurisdictions will often choose different options one from another. Indeed, often they already have. good grounds for setting the presumption one way rather than another, as we sometimes do, it may be perfectly legitimate to let the outcome often be determined by the defaults built into Asymmetrical Special-Majority rules. But more often there seems to be no good reason for allowing decision rules to favour one outcome over any other in that way, in advance.
The Asymmetrical version of the Special-Majority rule is the most familiar form.
Were it the only form, unease at the arbitrariness of setting a presumption one way rather than some other (absent any grounds for setting a presumption either way) would incline us toward Simple Majority rule instead. That is certainly the standard way of avoiding any arbitrary bias in favour of one 'default' option. 58 The asymmetrical form is not the only possible form of special-majority voting, however. Special-majority requirements can be specified in such a way as to apply equally to all options. Under a Symmetrical Special-Majority rule, no option is privileged as the default option. Arbitrariness is avoided, just as it is under Simple Majority voting. And something else is achieved as well: procedurally, the special protection that comes with the 'special majority' requirement is afforded to minority interests; epistemically, a higher standard of proof for making decisions is implemented. Such special minority protection or such a special standard of proof may not always be warranted, and, where they are not, Simple Majority rule works well. But where we have good reasons for thinking that larger-than-bare majorities ought to be required for decisions in any direction, we ought to use a Symmetrical SpecialMajority rule instead. And with the symmetrical version of that rule, we can do so in full confidence that no option will be arbitrarily privileged by being the default option.
That decision rule has not heretofore received the attention it deserves, owing perhaps to doubts as to its practical feasibility. Symmetrical Special-Majority rules run the risk of leaving too many things open, which might be undesirable. That practical concern can be addressed, however, if we supplement the Symmetrical Special-Majority rule with other decision procedures, such as venue-shifting options available in the judicial or federal realms.
APPENDIX I: MAJORITARIAN-TYPE RULES AND THEIR PROPERTIES
A Majoritarian-Type Rule with parameters k -and k + (k + > k -). For any v, Proof. It is easy to see that a Majoritarian-type rule satisfies (U), (A) and (M).
Conversely, suppose a voting rule f satisfies (U), (M) and (A).
Step 1. We show that, for any v, w, 
we have f(v) ≥ f(w), as required.
Step 2.
Step 1 implies that there exists an increasing function g : {-n, -n+1, …, n-1, n} → {-1, 0, 1} such that, for any v, f(v) = g(Σv i ). This implies that there exist k -, k + ∈{-n, -n+1, …, n-1, n}, where k -<k + , such that
The following propositions state some properties of a Majoritarian-Type rule.
Proposition A2. A Majoritarian-type rule never takes the value -1 if k -< -n; it never takes the value 1 if k + > n; it never takes the value 0 if k + -k -= 1 or [k + -k -= 2 and k + and n are both odd]. 
if n is even, and c < 1-p < p if n is odd. Therefore c is not significantly greater than 1/2, in the technical sense defined above. By Condorcet's formula, 60 Pr 1-p) ).
The case c = 0 corresponds to Simple Majority rule. The case c significantly greater than 0 but less than n log(p/(1-p)) corresponds to a Special-Majority rule. The case c greater than or equal to n log(p/(1-p)) corresponds to Imposed Indifference. The trilemmas in Figure 1 help us see what is at stake in the choice among alternative voting rules. The decision tree in Figure 2 summarizes that choice. 
FIGURE 2: GROUNDS FOR CHOOSING AMONG DECISION RULES

